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Lojack is a stolen vehicle tracking technology that achieves extremely high recovery rates.
Ayres and Levitt (1998) show that introduction of the system produced large reductions in
vehicle thefts in areas where it was implemented in the United States. The reduced theft risk
was shared by all vehicle owners, not only those who bought Lojack. This paper, in contrast, uses
the introduction of Lojack to a publicly known set of Ford car models in some Mexican states
to show that Lojack generates negative externalities if thieves can distinguish between Lojack
and non-Lojack-equipped cars. The empirical analysis suggests that, although Lojack-equipped
vehicles experienced a reduction in theft risk of 55%, most of the averted thefts were replaced
by thefts of non-Lojack-equipped automobiles in neighboring states. The increase in thefts in
non Lojack-serviced states was especially strong for the same car models that in Lojack-serviced
states were sold equipped with Lojack.
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11 Introduction
Auto theft is an extremely salient property crime: the value of the stolen goods is substantial and
violence is often involved. Auto theft can be seen as a conict between vehicle owners, manufac-
turers, and authorities on one side - - whose objective is to minimize thefts - - and thieves and the
black market in general on the other side, who gain from the theft of automobiles. In this game,
technological improvements arrive continuously and can upset the equilibrium number of vehicles
being stolen. In terms of of technological innovations that make auto theft more dicult, Lojack
is one of the most ingenious in recent decades. Lojack is a tracking technology that allows stolen
vehicles to be located, and that produces extremely high recovery rates.
While it has proven to be an extremely eective recovery device for those who own it, there also
has been much interest in the externalities that the introduction of Lojack may have generated.
Ayres and Levitt (1998) showed that, in the United States, introduction of the Lojack system
resulted in large reductions in auto theft - - on the order of 10%-50% - - where the service became
available. While only a small proportion of vehicle owners actually purchased the recovery system
for their cars, the deterrence eect of Lojack was shared by all cars in the same geographic location
because thieves had no way of knowing which vehicles had Lojack and which did not. In other
words, those who purchased the system generated large positive externalities for other vehicle
owners.
In contrast, this paper shows that the existence of positive externalities depends crucially on
thieves not being able to distinguish Lojack-equipped vehicles from non-Lojack-equipped ones.
Selling Lojack to a discernible group of cars in fact generates a negative externality in terms of
displaced thefts from owners of Lojack-equipped vehicles to those without the tracking system.
I analyze the impact of the introduction of Lojack in Mexico, where it was publicly and exclu-
sively installed in new cars sold by Ford within a specic subset of vehicle models. The Lojack
recovery device was installed, free of charge, and the recovery service was paid for during one year
in new Ford cars included in the program from participating states. The program was rolled out
gradually, both on the intensive margin - - with new Ford models entering the program at dierent
moments in time - - and the extensive one, with an expansion over time in the number of states
where the program was implemented. I use variation over time in theft risk, at the state and car
1model level, to measure both the impact of Lojack in deterring auto theft for Lojack-equipped
vehicles and the displacements in theft risk that this generated on non-Lojack vehicles.
In Mexico, I nd Lojack generated increased thefts of vehicles in states close to those where
Lojack was implemented, with especially strong impacts on the same models that were sold with
Lojack in the Lojack states. In states distant to those where Lojack was introduced, I nd no
signicant impact on theft rates. Within Lojack serviced states, I nd no statistically signicant
change in thefts among non-Lojack-equipped vehicles. Regarding Lojack-equipped vehicles, I nd
reductions in theft risk of around 55%. Further, among Lojack-equipped cars, although Lojack
coverage over time went from 100% when the cars were new to 40% when they were three years
old, the eect on thefts was roughly constant. This suggests that the deterrence eect of Lojack is
similar for Lojack coverage rates varying from 40% to 100%. Another way of saying this is that the
maximal deterrence eect of Lojack may well be attained with Lojack coverage rates below 40%,
and closer to the 1.5% to 2% that Ayres and Levitt (1998) analyzed.
The importance of this paper is twofold. First, it shows that Lojack was eective in reducing
auto theft of vehicles equipped with it in Mexico. The problem of reducing auto theft in developing
countries has been especially dicult to tackle because of corrupt and/or incompetent police forces.
Lojack may be an eective tool in reducing auto theft in such contexts. Second, the paper is
important because it measures the spillovers that Lojack generated on vehicles not equipped with
the device when it was sold to a distinguishable - - from the thieves' point of view - - set of cars. As
stressed by Clarke and Harris (1992), or Karmen (1981), some anti-theft devices simply generate a
displacement of theft to unprotected vehicles. In the case of Lojack, the same device can generate
either positive or negative externalities depending on how it is oered to the public; this suggests
that regulation of similar technologies in terms of how the product is oered to the public, can have
important consequences for societal welfare.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the recovery technology and
how it was implemented and oered to the public in Mexico. Section 3 provides a theoretical
framework for thinking about Lojack and the implications of selling it to an anonymous, rather
than a distinguishable, set of cars. Section 4 describes the data used in the paper. The estimation
strategy is discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 presents the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
22 Technology and Intervention
2.1 Technology
Lojack is an automobile recovery technology developed in the late 1980s in Massachusetts (United
States). After a successful expansion in its home country, Lojack had been introduced into over 30
countries by 2007.1 Lojack uses radio technology to recover stolen vehicles. The system consists of
two main components: a radio-frequency transceiver in the protected vehicles and a grid of locality-
specic tracking antennas. Every geographic location that is covered requires a combination of
tracking devices in xed locations, vehicles, or aircraft in order to provide the recovery service.
The specic combination depends on the topography, road system, and other relevant factors of
the locality.
Lojack has an extremely high recovery rate, with 90% of vehicles being recovered within 24
hours of the report (LoJack (2006)) and 95% eventually recovered (Romano (1991)).2 Its small size
- - similar to a deck of cards - - allows it to be hidden in many possible places inside a car, making
it hard to locate. The device has its own power source, meaning that it does not depend on the
car's battery to operate. Cars equipped with the device do not signal its presence with decals of
any sort. The company sells recovery { not deterrence { services, and announcing the presence of
Lojack in the vehicle may compromise the likelihood of recovery. Finally, it only emits the signal
once it is activated remotely. The combination of these factors make it impossible to know from a
visual exterior inspection if a car is equipped with Lojack.
The Lojack radio transceiver remains dormant unless a theft occurs. If an owner realizes that
the vehicle has been stolen, she calls Lojack and her specic device is remotely activated. Once the
signal is active, any of the tracking devices can perceive it if the car is in close proximity. After
a signal becomes visible for one of the trackers, mobile trackers can be sent to follow and nd the
stolen vehicle. The radio signal is perceptible to the tracking devices even if the vehicle is in a
covered environment, like a warehouse, a building, or a container. Competing technologies based
on GPS are mainly used for better logistics, not as recovery devices. In fact, GPS antennas are
conspicuous and are severely compromised if the vehicle is under a roof.
1www.lojack.com
2The information on Lojack is based on discussions with company executives in Mexico and on information from
their web page.
32.2 Intervention
Installing a Lojack recovery system in a locality requires large xed costs. These take the form
of lengthy agreements with the local police, regulatory approvals, and the cost of installing the
network of tracking equipment. The owners of the Lojack technology gave exclusive distribution
rights to a Mexican company to introduce the system in Mexico. The patent holders would supply
the equipment and the Mexican company would be in charge of the management of the system.
For a startup company, the large setup costs, together with uncertain demand for the product
made the enterprise extremely risky. The Mexican company decided to oer a major car builder
an exclusive agreement to have Lojack installed in its cars. The vehicle recovery company would
instantly gain a large customer, improving the short-term viability of the company, and the large
car manufacturer would oer an exclusive benet for its customers. Ford Motor Company of Mexico
agreed to be the sole Lojack customer for a prearranged period.
Ford Motors agreed to pay the Lojack company a xed cost per unit installed. In exchange
for the payment, the company provided the transceiver, installation costs, and one year of Lojack
recovery services. After the rst year, customers had the option of continuing the recovery service
at an annual cost of around $100.
The system was rst tested at the end of 1999 in a single Mexican state with a single Ford
model. In 2002, after the trial period, the Lojack tracking system was introduced into four states
in Mexico. Once the recovery system had been implemented, Ford distributors in the covered
states engaged in large publicity campaigns to inform the population which of their models were
equipped with Lojack. Lojack gradually was introduced into dierent models beginning in 2002,
and continuing until 2005. In total, 13 dierent Ford models came equipped with Lojack in the
period I study. A list of the Lojack models, the states, and dates of introduction into the program
can be found in Table 1. Once a Ford model in a state came equipped with Lojack, it maintained
its Lojack status throughout the period being analyzed. That is, once a car became part of the
Lojack program, all newer version of the cars were sold with the device.
Like other major automobile manufacturers in Mexico, Ford and its distributors have an agree-
ment to sell new vehicles for the same price nationally. The Ford Lojack program did not change
this arrangement: customers in Lojack states paid the same price for a vehicle as customers in
4non-Lojack states.
The company administrating Lojack was in charge of obtaining the permits and necessary
regulatory approvals. Lojack managers decided to operate the tracking system jointly with the
local police forces. The high degree of control over the tracking system - - as opposed to simply
handing it over to the police - - was arguably the best option in an environment where police forces
were not deemed suciently trustworthy or reliable to operate the system up to its full capabilities.
However, local police cooperation was always necessary given that, in Mexico, taking possession of
stolen property is an exclusive attribute of police forces.
3 Theoretical Framework
The following simple framework aims to clarify why dierent eects on auto thefts can be expected
according to the way Lojack is oered to the public. Assume that when making the decision to steal,
the thief takes into account the costs and benets of his action. Let Bij represent the monetary
payo to the thief of stealing a car, model i in state j, and delivering it to the local chop shop.
The probability of failure is Pthief(Lojackij). The thief does not obtain payment if he is caught by
the police or if the car is recovered by Lojack before he gets to the shop. The probability of failure
depends explicitly on whether the car that is stolen is equipped with Lojack.
During the time that the thief is in possession of the stolen vehicle, the police or Lojack may
recover it and, in the process, apprehend the perpetrator. Assume that if the car is recovered before
the thief delivers it, the thief is sent to jail. This generates a utility loss for the thief of  J < 0.
Let Qij denote the total number of cars of model i stolen in state j during a year. The (marginal)
cost to the thief of stealing a car can be described by C(Qij;Sij;Xi), where Sij is the stock of cars in
the state and Xi represents vehicle characteristics like the diculty in picking the lock and starting
the vehicle. For a given stock of cars on the road, the more stolen, the higher is the cost of nding
and stealing the car, i.e. @C=@Qij > 0. It is reasonable to assume that cars that are targeted rst
are those that are easy to steal: those located close to the chop shop, or those that are parked on
the street, as opposed to inside a garage, for example. This would make the (marginal) cost of
stealing the cars increase with the number stolen, after controlling for vehicle characteristics (Xi)
and the amount subject to being stolen (Sij). The cost of stealing is incurred independent of the
5success of the theft attempt. It consists of time and the equipment cost of the theft. The thief will
decide to steal a car whenever
Bij  (1   Pthief(Lojackij))   J  Pthief(Lojackij)  C(Qij;Sij;Xi)
the left-hand side represents the expected benet of the theft attempt, which is compared to the
marginal cost of doing so on the right-hand side of the equation.
When a chop shop buys a stolen car, it benets from the purchase through possibly various
channels. First, it can reintroduce the car into the legitimate market with false documents and a
fake vehicle identication number (VIN). Second, it can export the car to another country, where
it can be sold as a legally imported vehicle. Third, it can chop up the car and sell the stolen parts.
Fourth, it can sell the car as \an input" to other crimes. These input cars are usually abandoned
a few minutes after a major crime, like kidnapping, or a bank robbery, has been committed.
The income for the chop shop from the combination of these activities can be subsumed into an
increasing and concave function of the number of cars processed by the shop. Let !(qk
ij) represent
gross income for shop k in state j from processing q stolen cars of model i. In deciding how many
cars to process, the chop shop is assumed to maximize expected utility. The cost of buying an
additional car is Bij, the cash that is paid to the thief for delivering a vehicle to the shop. For each
additional car processed, the shop obtains !0(qk
ij) if its operation is not discovered by the police.
For every car processed by the shop, there is an independent probability Pshop(Lojackij) of the












The more cars processed by the shop, the larger the cumulative probability that the operation is
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The rst term of the condition is the usual marginal benet (!0(qk
ij)) equals marginal cost (Bij),
while the second term in F is the incurred cost of processing an additional car in terms of the increase
6in the probability of the shop being discovered. Considering that the income one shop generates is
aected by what other shops do, the benet function should be thought of as depending on other







The second component in (1), representing the number of cars of the same model processed by other




ij) increases, this will depress the benets obtained by shop k. B ij is expected to generate
a positive eect because of substitutability across car models for many of the components that
drive !. For example, the demand for stolen cars as an input to other crimes should exhibit a large
amount of substitutability across car models. In terms of !, the higher the price for car models
dierent from those processed by shop k, the higher the benets. Similarly, the higher the price
of cars processed by shop k in other states (Bi j), the higher the benets. This occurs because of
spatial spillovers: if the price of stolen parts of a certain car increase in one state, then consumers
of stolen parts in neighboring states will increase demand for parts in the state with lower prices.
In equilibrium, Bij =
C(Qij;Sij;Xi)+JPthief(Lojackij)
(1 Pthief(Lojackij)) . It is straightforward to check that
@F
@Pthief < 0 ;
@F





Because Lojack increases the probability of being caught, both for the thief and the shop, the
equilibrium quantity stolen falls if the car is equipped with Lojack:
@qk
ij
@ Lojack < 0, where qk
ij solves
F = 0.
I now can compare two distinct ways of making the device available to the public. In the
United States, wherever Lojack recovery services were available, the device was oered to anyone
who wished to purchase it. Because cars bore no visible indication of having Lojack - - such as
decals - - thieves had a hard time determining if the car they intended to steal had Lojack. In
such a framework, it is as if there are n cars in state j, and a proportion  of them randomly
get Lojack. Because thieves have diculty determining whether a car has Lojack, a rational thief
will assign probability  to any car being equipped with the device. (More specically, he would
7assign the same probability of having Lojack to all cars of similar visible characteristics.) In the
model's equilibrium, thefts decrease for both Lojack and non-Lojack equipped vehicles: the theft
deterrence provided by Lojack is shared equally among all cars. Given that non-Lojack car owners
took no action but benetted from lower theft probability, Lojack can be said to be providing
positive externalities. Ayres and Levitt (1998) investigate the eects of making Lojack available to
the public in this way in the United States. Consistent with the model, they document a strong
reduction in theft rates for all cars in localities where Lojack was introduced. In fact, the total
externality - - in monetary terms - - is estimated to be around ten times as large as the private
benet to the Lojack car owner. However, as with most goods with positive externalities, there is
underprovision relative to the socially optimal level.
The way Lojack was oered in localities where it was introduced in Mexico can be described as
selling Lojack only to a discernible group of cars: Ford models participating in the Lojack program.
This allowed thieves to identify and dierentiate between those cars with Lojack and those without.
Thieves could avoid cars that had a high probability of having Lojack. The model predicts a fall
in the thefts of Lojack equipped cars. Additionally, given that dierent models are substitutes,
the reduction in thefts of Lojack-equipped cars can be displaced towards non-Lojack-equipped ones
( @F
@B ij > 0). If this prediction of the model is correct, then car owners of non-Lojack vehicles
might be saddled with increased theft rates, even though they took no action. In other words,
Lojack equipped car owners may have generated a negative externality for other vehicle owners.
What should be clear from the model is that the same theft prevention technology can have either
positive or negative externalities depending on how it is oered to the public.
On the other hand, there is the possibility that Lojack promoted a reduction in chop shops in
a locality, or increased the incarceration rates of auto thieves. In that case, Lojack may have had
a positive eect on the theft rates of non-Lojack-equipped vehicles. This would happen if for some
reason chop shops dealt with both Lojack and non-Lojack vehicles. With Lojack increasing the
probability of detection of the shop's operation, it would reduce the equilibrium number of cars
processed, both Lojack and Non-Lojack cars.
The theoretical prediction of diering externality consequences according to the degree of dis-
cernibility for thieves of Lojack equipped vehicles begs the question of why the Lojack company
decided not to explicitly signal that a car was protected with Lojack with a decal. The main reason
8is that Lojack's business is to provide a reliable recovery service in the event of theft. Advertising
that a car has Lojack may compromise recovery rates because thieves may take actions to make
the recovery less likely. Lojack provides important deterrence eects, which are the focus of this
study, although that is not the main concern of the auto recovery system managers.
The negative externality produced by Lojack can be subdivided into two categories: within a
Lojack state and in non-Lojack states. The former are referred to as Within-State Externalities
while the latter are referred to as Geographical Externalities. The framework presented here focuses
exclusively on thefts of vehicles. However, the intervention could be analyzed from the more
comprehensive framework of crime in general (Becker, 1968). This is not attempted in this paper
because of lack of state-level crime data in Mexico. However, the possible displacement of auto
theft with the introduction of Lojack towards other kinds of property crime was investigated by
Ayres and Levitt (1998). They used available crime data for the United States, but found no
displacement eects.
4 Data
The data used in this research consist of detailed auto sales and theft reports at the Mexican state
level. Because there is no country-wide auto theft database compiled by a government agency in
Mexico, no longitudinal crime studies using Mexican data have been performed up to now. This
paper is the rst to use detailed auto theft data on Mexico from a a novel source, the internal
reports generated by the Mexican Association of Insurance Companies (AMIS).3
AMIS is a non-prot organization funded by insurance companies that compiles industry-wide
theft and accident rates. These statistics are then used by members of the association to price
insurance contracts. AMIS associated companies have a market share of over 80% of the automobile
insurance market. The AMIS auto theft dataset is not publicly available, but its use was authorized
for this study. The database is generated continuously in this automatic manner: when an insured
vehicle is stolen, the owner calls his insurance company to le a report; as soon as the employee
of the insurance company lls out the electronic report for the company's use, a copy of it is
automatically sent to the compiling system at AMIS. Note that, under this system, if a stolen
3www.amis.org.mx
9vehicle is recovered, the report of the robbery is still preserved.
In this study I use AMIS data on all countrywide theft cases reported from January 1999 to
August 2005. Each entry in the dataset is a theft report, which includes the brand and model of
the car, the date and state where the robbery occurred, and the year the car was sold. Unlike
the case of uninsured vehicles, thefts of insured vehicles are very likely to be recorded for nancial
reasons.
The auto sales data were provided by the Mexican Association of the Automobile Industry
(AMIA).4 AMIA is a non-prot organization formed by the principal vehicle distributors and man-
ufacturers in the country, which compiles detailed data on automobile sales. The series used here
are annual dealership sales at the state level from 1999 to 2005. The data were available aggregated
into various categories of brand and car type. For each brand, the vehicles were classied into cat-
egories: subcompacts, compacts, luxury cars, sports cars, SUVs, minivans, and trucks. The AMIS
theft data was aggregated to match the AMIA sales data (annual state sales for each model group)
and both datasets were then merged. The resulting groups of cars are shown in Table 1. Some of
the groups consist of single models, while others contain various models. Throughout the paper,
the terms model and model-group are used interchangeably to refer to the groupings of vehicles in
Table 1.
The econometric analysis uses variation in theft risk over time to identify the eect of Lojack.
For that reason, the unit of observation should be car models whose theft risk can be followed
throughout the analysis period. All thefts cases of cars sold up to 1998 but stolen between 1999
and 2005 were not used as units of observation because of lack of data on the stock susceptible to
being stolen: state level sales of any car model marketed before 1999.
The second type of discarded observations was car models introduced into the national market
after Lojack was implemented. For these vehicles, it is impossible to analyze theft risk before Lojack
was introduced. Therefore, car models introduced after 2001 were not used in this study. Similarly,
some models were discontinued before the Lojack intervention. For these models, there is no post-
treatment data available to analyze theft behavior, so they are left out. After these deletions, I
have data on car models for which information on theft risk is available before and after Lojack was
implemented. In total there are 69 model-groups (some brands have more than one car model per
4www.amia.com.mx
10category and are grouped in the data) for which I have up to 28 observations in each of 32 Mexican
states: 7 annual theft observations per state for cars sold in 1999, 6 annual theft observations
per state for cars sold in 2000, and so on, with only one theft observation for cars sold in 2005.
However, the data do not consist of these 59,892 possible cases mainly because some car models
have no distribution channels in low population states. Further, some car models - - especially
sports cars and luxury cars - - are not sold in some of the poorer states. The nal dataset has a
total of 36,406 observations available for analyzing the impact of Lojack on auto theft dynamics.
As I mentioned before, 13 of the 69 car groups are Ford models that obtained Lojack. This Lojack
intervention occurred in four states during the period of analysis. The summary statistics of auto
theft behavior are presented in Table 2.
In panel A of the table, a summary of the variables used in the statistical analysis are presented.
The unit of observation is a quadruple (model group, state, year sold, year stolen) combination
with available data. The average unit of observation has 619 vehicles, and 3.5 thefts. This results
in a mean annual theft rate of 6 cars per 1000 vehicles. The maximum number of thefts in any of
the observation units was 1,502. The cars being studied are relatively new: they range from zero
to six completed years on the road.5 The average car age is 1.95 years. The mean age is not three
because, by construction, the data has fewer observations of older cars: all cars are observed when
they are new, but the only observations available for six year old cars are those that were made in
1999. Lojack is a dummy variable equal to one if the car is equipped with Lojack. Out of all the
observation units, 0.64% had Lojack installed when they were new.
Panel D in the table focuses on vehicles that were Lojack equipped when they were sold. Lojack
equipped vehicles are newer than those in the entire sample, with a mean age of 0.72 years, because
the Lojack program was introduced in the latter part of the analysis period. Lojack equipped
observations have a mean of 2.97 thefts and a mean stock of 558 vehicles. Panels B and E of the
table divide the observations into two groups, Lojack and non-Lojack models. In the table, as
throughout the paper, a Lojack model is one of the 13 Ford models that participated in the Lojack
program. In panel B, all observations pertaining to Lojack models are included, even those for years
before the program was implemented and for states where Lojack was never implemented. Lojack
models had an average stock of cars susceptible to being stolen of 225 units, while non-Lojack
5Age is set to 0 if the vehicle is less than 12 months old, 1 if it is between 12 and 24 months old, etc.
11models had an average stock of 721 units. Mean theft cases for Lojack models are correspondingly
smaller than those for non-Lojack models: 1.08 and 4.15, respectively. Dividing mean thefts by
the mean stock of cars on the road reveals that theft rates were smaller for Lojack models: 4 per
1000 versus 5 per 1000 (this rate is an underestimate of the theft rate because the numerator only
includes thefts of insured vehicles.) Finally, panels C and D of the table divide the observations
into two groups: Lojack States and non-Lojack States. This partition highlights the fact that
average sales in Lojack states are larger than in non-Lojack states. The mean stock of cars in the
observation units in the former is 1,703, while in non-Lojack states it is 381. Furthermore, Lojack
states on average are high crime states: dividing mean thefts by the mean stock of cars yields
an estimate of nine thefts per 1000 in Lojack states and only two per 1000 in non-Lojack states.
Finally, the table indicates that 3.5% of Lojack state observations correspond to vehicles that were
equipped with Lojack when they were sold.
A rst caveat with this data is that it provides information about where the car was sold, but
not where the car currently resides. Although the latter is preferred, if the probability that a
car of a given model and year migrates from state j to state i is equal to the probability that a
car of the same model and year migrates from state i to j, then the rst variable is a noisy but
unbiased measure of the number of cars in a state. However, one can imagine that some states are
net exporters of cars to other states. This would induce a systematic error in the measure of cars
exposed to theft, and receives attention in the section on robustness checks.
A second and more important caveat is that the data available here are not total number of
thefts, but rather total number thefts of insured vehicles. The Robustness Checks section provides
evidence that Lojack introduction did not have any eect on the rate at which Lojack models were
being insured; this is important in identifying the eect of Lojack on theft risk for dierent vehicles.
5 Estimation Strategy
This paper focuses on the evolution of theft risk and its relationship to the introduction of Lojack.
The theft variable used is the number of vehicles stolen; it is non-negative and integer-valued. A
histogram of the theft variable is presented in Figure 1. As the gure makes clear, over 60% of the
observations are zero. When the dependent variable is this type, OLS is problematic because the
12conditional mean function takes on negative values. I therefore use the canonical model for count
data in my estimations: the Poisson regression model. The estimated equation is:
E[Theftsijytjxijyt] = (Sijy)  exp
 
ij + j  t + Lojack  Lojackijyt +
6 X
a=0
a  I[Age = a]
!
(2)
where the dependent variable (Theftsijyt) is the number of vehicles stolen in any given state,
model group, year made, and year stolen combination. Sijy refers to the state-specic annual sales
of each car model, which is a proxy for the stock of cars susceptible to being stolen in every state,
model-group, and production year combination. The estimated equation also includes a xed eect
(ij) for every combination of state and car model in the data. This incorporates the fact that
theft risk varies according to location (state) and type (model group). A time trend, specic to all
vehicles in a state (j t) is also included. The purpose of this regressor is to allow for state-specic
dynamics in theft risk. All vehicles in the same state are subject to the same police and judiciary
institutions, which may have dierent dynamics over time in every state.
In the regressions, the coecient of interest is some variant of a dummy variable indicating
that Lojack had been implemented. For expositional purposes, the regressor of interest is simply
denoted Lojackijyt in the remainder of this section. However, in the Results section, the specic
denition of the regressor is presented and the data used are clearly dened for each of the estimated
regressions.
Finally, all of the regressions include a full set of vehicle-age dummies (I[Age = t   y]). These
regressors, in a completely exible way, capture the mean theft schedule according to the age of
the car. This is relevant because theft risk varies by how old the car is. Typically, newer cars are
subject to higher theft risk because they provide a higher payo in the black market. All regression
standard errors are clustered at the state level (Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004)).6
Sijy allows for a meaningful comparison of theft even if the quantity of cars subject to risk varies
by model. That is, given that dierent models have radically dierent market shares, any analysis
of auto theft that distinguishes among models in the same geographic location must control for
the quantity of cars subject to theft. In a Poisson regression, this is referred to as \controlling for
6Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006) two-way clustered standard errors at the state and year level were also
calculated, without changing the signicance of the main results.
13exposure". The exposure variable (Sijy), is usually incorporated with a coecient constrained to
unity. This introduces the assumption that thefts are a function of the stock of cars and that this
relationship is the same across all car models: a doubling of the stock accompanied by a doubling
of thefts is interpreted as keeping theft risk constant.7
The descriptive statistics showed that there is much heterogeneity in theft risk depending on the
model and/or the state in question. In such situations, one major worry is that estimated eects
may simply be capturing cross-sectional dierences in theft risk, particularly in cases such as this
one in which the treatment was not randomly assigned. This concern is addressed by including a
xed eect (ij) for every (state, car model) in the data. In other words, average dierences in
theft behavior across car models or states are not the source of identication of the coecient of
interest.
The fact that various observations are available for the years before Lojack was introduced
means that I do not rely on the assumption that time trends in theft dynamics were identical in
treated and non-treated states. The specication that I use directly estimates a linear time trend
of theft risk that is common to all car models in a particular state (j t). So, all states are allowed
to have dierential trends in theft, guaranteeing that the results are not driven by dierential theft
dynamics at the state level. I obtain identication of Lojack from an upward or downward shift
in the theft rate in the years after Lojack was implemented from what was predicted by the linear
trend estimated from the years before the introduction of Lojack. This specication makes the
traditional concerns about the selection of the control group in a dierence-in-dierence context
much less relevant (see Miguel and Kremer (2004) for more on this). Many studies rely on an
assumption of equality of trends in the pre-treatment periods; in this case, the identication of the
coecient of interest does not come from control and treatment group dierences, but rather from
deviations from a linear time trend estimated using pre-treatment data.
The exponential form of the conditional expectation, and the fact that the coecient of interest,
Lojack, is associated with a dummy variable, makes interpretation of the coecient highly intuitive.
The ratio of expected thefts conditional on having Lojack to expected thefts conditional on not





Note that the eect is independent of the values of the other regressors in xijyt. For this reason,
I report exponentiated coecients, also known as incidence rate ratios (IRR), in addition to the
Poisson regression coecients for each regression in the results tables.
Poisson regressions have this advantage: it is straightforward to obtain an estimate of the
magnitude of the eect in terms of the number of cars stolen. So, the third column in each of
the regressions in the tables, labeled Count, reports a transformation of the Poisson coecient




(E[Theftsijytjxijyt; Lojackijyt = 1]   E[Theftsijytjxijyt; Lojackijyt = 0])
Because of the conditional expectation's form, this simple sum can be rewritten as the percent
change in thefts attributable to Lojack multiplied by the pre-Lojack average annual thefts in the
group:





E[Theftsijtj Lojackijyt = 0]
1
A (3)
This is simply a function of the Poisson coecient and the size of the group of aected cars. The
standard errors are obtained with the delta method, using those reported in the coecient column.
The theoretical framework suggests that Lojack should clearly be negative for vehicles equipped
with Lojack. It also suggests that the reduction in thefts from Lojack vehicles should have generated
higher thefts in vehicles not equipped with Lojack, because of substitution eects. Evidence of
negative externalities would take the form of a positive Lojack coecient in the specications using
data from vehicles not equipped with Lojack. Furthermore, I expect the spillover eect to be
present in states close to those where Lojack was introduced, but decreasing with distance from
the closest treated state.
An extensive literature has focused on the diculty in measuring program eects when partici-
pation is voluntary. This problem is not present in Ford's Lojack program though. The Ford's were
sold for the same price nationally, regardless of whether the state was participating in the Lojack
15program. This yields two benets. First, conditional on buying a Lojack model, participation in
the program was not voluntary. Ford engaged in this program under the rationale that it would be
able to sell more cars, albeit with a lower margin. Any eect of Lojack on sales is controlled for in
the empirical analysis through the stock-of-cars exposure control. Second, the single national price,
together with the locality-specic recovery service, means that there was practically no incentive
for customers to buy their cars in a dierent state from where they lived. With equal prices, a cus-
tomer in a Lojack state had no incentive to buy a car in a non-Lojack state. Similarly, a customer
in a non-Lojack state had scant incentive to buy a Lojack-equipped car and drive it to a state that
did not have the Lojack recovery service available.
The use of xed eects in the estimation generates a stronger requirement for the error term
than in a cross section. Specically,
Theftsijytjij;Sij1;:::;SijY ;Lojackij11;:::;LojackijY T  Poisson(ijyt) t = 1;:::;T y = 1;:::;Y
where ijyt is given by (1). Conversations with Ford executives suggest that the decision of which
cars to equip with Lojack were not based on recent theft behavior of Ford vehicles; that provides
some assurance that the exogeneity assumption is valid.
Finally, remember that the Poisson regression model assumes conditional equidispersion of
the dependent variable. This is a consequence of the fact that the expectation of the random
variable is equal to its variance in the Poisson distribution. Conditional overdispersion invalidates
inference because estimated standard errors are too small. Whenever the data present a large
degree of overdispersion, the alternative is to allow the conditional variance to be a function of the
conditional mean: this model is known as Negative Binomial. However, unlike the Poisson model,
the Negative Binomial model is not robust to distributional misspecication. That is, if the data is
not Negative-Binomial distributed, then the estimated coecients are inconsistent. On the other
hand, the Poisson model is robust to mispecication, in the sense that estimation is consistent
even if the dependent variable is not Poisson distributed (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Its only
requirement for consistency is that the conditional mean be correctly specied, which is identical
to the condition of the classical OLS model.
For this reason, unless there are high levels of overdispersion, the Poisson model is preferred.
16The strategy I adopt is to estimate the degree of conditional overdispersion present in the data,
and to show that it very limited. Second, in the Robustness Checks section I present the estimates
from the Negative Binomial regression and show that the standard errors are virtually unchanged
from one estimation method or the other. Given that the trouble with overdispersion is having
standard errors that are too small, the results allow me to focus on the Poisson estimation results.
I use the test suggested in Cameron and Trivedi (1998) to measure the presence and extent of
dispersion in the data. Let
H0 : E[Theftsijytjxijyt] = V [Theftsijytjxijyt] = ij
and
Ha : E[Theftsijytjxijyt] = ij & V [Theftsijytjxijyt] = ij(1 + ij)
The second condition implies that E[(Theftsijyt ij)2 Theftsijytjxijyt] = 2
ij. However, under
H0,  = 0. This suggests the following dispersion test: let the tted values of the Poisson regression
be ^ ij = e
x0
ijyt ^ . If the following model is estimated,
(Theftsijyt   ^ ij)2   Theftsijyt
^ ij
= ^ ij + uijyt
one obtains an estimate for the value of . Under equidispersion,  = 0. If  < 1, overdispersion
is modest and the Poisson and Negative Binomial yield similar results because the Poisson model
is the special case of the Negative Binomial with no overdispersion. In the reported tables, an
estimate of  obtained in this fashion is presented in the last row.
6 Results
A preliminary analysis of the data can be obtained by reporting theft rates (dened as Thefts=Stock of Cars),
as is done in Table 3. To generate a simple comparison between groups, I report theft rates before
and after Lojack introduction. In the table, I split the observations into three groups: Lojack
states, nearby non-Lojack States and distant non-Lojack states. Each of these is then subdivided
into Lojack and non-Lojack model columns. The rst two rows distinguish between observations
17that occurred before and after the Lojack program was implemented.8
In the table, the rst thing to notice is that Lojack models in Lojack states, as a group,
experienced a strong decrease in theft rates once Lojack was introduced. This is preliminary
evidence that Lojack had a strong impact on thefts of Lojack cars, generating a reduction on the
order of 45%, according to the simple comparisons in the table. None of the other groups seem to
have experienced higher theft rates in the years after Lojack was introduced in Lojack states. The
approach used in the table, with a rate as the dependent variable, has the problem that cells with
small denominators can change the results because they can easily generate extremely large theft
rates. Indeed, the results presented in the table do not include observations in which fewer than
ve cars were susceptible to being stolen. This is one important reason for using a methodology like
the Poisson regression, which does not suer from observations with small denominators driving
the results.
I rst determine whether there is any evidence that Lojack generated negative externalities
in states that were not part of the Lojack program - - i.e. Geographical Externalities. I do this
by using data from non-Lojack states and looking for unexpected increases in theft once Lojack is
introduced in the nearest Lojack state. Figure 2 diagramatically explains the identication strategy.
I use data from non-Lojack states, estimate a state specic time trend of thefts, and introduce a
dummy regressor called After Lojack which is equal to 1 if Lojack has been introduced into the
nearest Lojack state. The estimated equation is:
E[Theftsijytjxijyt] = (Sijy)exp
 
ij + j  t + After Lojack  After Lojackijyt +
6 X
a=0
a  I[Age = a]
!
There are two things to notice here: Only non-Lojack state data is used, but each state is allowed
its own time trend, so the After Lojack coecient identies mean changes in thefts that are
coincidental with the introduction of Lojack into the nearest Lojack state. As explained before, I
expect negative externalities to be less important the more distant a state is to where Lojack was
implemented. For this reason, I subdivided the non-Lojack state observations into three groups,
8Since Lojack was not implemented at the same time in all intervention states, each model in each state has a
dierent cuto date that denes its before and after. This is useful for the econometric analysis, but not so for the
purposes of the table, that uses a unique cuto point. Table 3 takes the approach of using 2003 as the cuto date,
when most of the vehicles were treated. It excludes Lojack models that were treated in 2004 and 2005. A dierent
approach is taken in Table 7, which does not exclude models treated in 2004 and 2005. Both tables present the same
behavior.
18as shown in Figure 3: states contiguous to Lojack states, states adjacent to the contiguous states,
and the rest of states.
For each distance category, I estimate a regression, and the results are presented in Table 4.
For each distance category (top, middle, and bottom panels), I report the results of the three
regressions: eects on all cars, on Lojack cars only, and on non-Lojack cars only.
As explained in the Estimation Strategy section, for each regression presented in the tables,
the rst column reports the Poisson coecient associated with the After Lojack regressor. The
second column reports Incidence Rate Ratios, which are exponentiated coecients obtained from
the Poisson regression. They are interpreted as the ratio of expected thefts with Lojack to expected
thefts without the Lojack intervention. An incidence rate ratio of 1 means there is no dierence
in expected thefts from one situation to the other. The third column, labeled Count, reports the
estimated impact of Lojack in terms of additional cars stolen (if positive) or decreased cases of
theft (if negative).
The results of the top panel indicate that, coincident with the introduction of Lojack in contigu-
ous states, there was a statistically signicant increase in thefts of all cars. Moreover, the eect was
particularly strong for Lojack models. The increase is on the order of 120% for Lojack models and
25% for non-Lojack ones. The count columns in the top panel suggest that an annual increase of 90
auto thefts occurred in contiguous states with the introduction of Lojack. Of these, the other two
regressions suggest that approximately 21 corresponded to Lojack models and 80 to Non Lojack
models.
In the middle panel of the table, the same regression is tted using observations of states in the
second ring around Lojack states. The same qualitative results hold: an increase in thefts beyond
what a state-specic linear time trend would have predicted in those states.
Finally, the last panel of the table shows that there is no statistically signicant eect of Lojack
in states far from those where Lojack was implemented. When estimated separately, no signicant
eects were found for either Lojack or non-Lojack models. In conclusion, the evidence in Table
4 suggests that the introduction of Lojack was accompanied by increases in thefts in neighboring
states; and among Lojack cars, thefts nearly doubled, while other car models saw an increase of 25%
in their theft risk. For states far from those where Lojack was introduced, there was no statistically
signicant eect on theft risk associated with Lojack introduction.
19The second group of vehicles that could have been aected by the introduction of Lojack are
those in Lojack states that were not Lojack models. To analyze the theft risk of this group, I use
observations of non-Lojack models in Lojack states and non-Lojack models in the third distance
category states. The geographical externality regressions suggested that states distant from Lojack
ones were unaected by Lojack and thus can serve as control observations. However, it should
be clear that the impact of the choice of the control group on the estimations is very limited,
because the Lojack coecient is estimated from a break in theft trends in the Lojack state data9
The coecient of interest is captured by the After Lojack dummy variable, which is equal to one
if the car model does not have Lojack but another car model in the state does. The theoretical
framework section predicted a displacement eect towards this group of cars. However, as also was
mentioned there, this group may have experienced a decrease in thefts because of a reduction in
chop-shops, or higher incarceration of auto thieves. The estimated regression model is:
E[Theftsijytjxijyt] = (Sijy)exp
 
ij + j  t + After Lojack  After Lojackijyt +
6 X
a=0
a  I[Age = a]
!
Note that the After Lojack variable is dierent from the one written above: this one refers to
Within-State Externalities, while the previous regression captured Geographical Externalities. In
the rst column of Table 5 there is an insignicant impact of Lojack on this group. Although there
may have been some displacement to non-Lojack models, the eect may be too small relative to the
number of non-Lojack cars sold and stolen in the group to capture an eect precisely. In Lojack
states, Lojack models represented 6.5% of average annual sales. Even if I assumed a displacement
eect towards other cars that fully oset the decrease in thefts of Lojack equipped cars, the impact
on the non-Lojack cars in Lojack states would be so small (in percentage terms) that it would be
hard to identify in the data. On the other hand, that is not the case in surrounding (smaller sales)
states, where displaced thefts could have large relative eects that could more easily be captured
by the regressions.
I also can focus more specically on an interesting subgroup of the one above: Lojack models
produced before Lojack was introduced. The expected direction of the spillover on this group is
not obvious. If a model looks very similar in the years just before and just after it got Lojack, it
9In the Robustness Checks section, the equation is estimated using only Lojack state data, with very similar
results to those of the main specication.
20may have been dicult for thieves to distinguish between those equipped with Lojack from those
that were not. Furthermore, even if they were distinguishable but the thieves were unsure about
when the program started, then one would expect some positive spillover eect of having Lojack
installed in future versions of the model. However, if there is little confusion for thieves about
which models had Lojack, and the cars are close substitutes, then one could nd negative spillovers
along this dimension, too. In other words, if auto thieves realize that Ford Windstars sold after
2000 have Lojack, do they increase or decrease the theft of close substitutes, like a Ford Windstar
sold in 1999?
To capture this eect, I use the Old Lojack Model dummy regressor, which is one for Lojack
models built before the model came equipped with Lojack, in years after Lojack was introduced
in its newer versions. The data used in the regression are observations of old Lojack models in
Lojack states and of old Lojack models in distant states. The results shown in Table 5 suggest that
this type of spillover was non-existent; i.e. there was no net displacement towards older versions of
Lojack models.
The results on the impact of Lojack on Lojack-equipped vehicles are presented in Table 6. The
estimated regression model is:
E[Theftsijytjxijyt] = (Sijy)exp
 
ij + j  t + Lojack  Lojack Equippedijyt +
6 X
a=0
a  I[Age = a]
!
Where Lojack equipped is a dummy variable equal to one if the car came equipped with Lojack
when it was rst sold. The data used in the regression are for Lojack models in Lojack states and
Lojack models in distant states, where no geographical externalities were found. The estimated
coecient indicates that Lojack generated a reduction in the theft rate of Lojack equipped vehicles
of 55%. In terms of thefts averted, the regression estimates that 152 vehicles were prevented from
being stolen annually due to the deterrence eects of Lojack.
Although the previous regression captures the average eect of Lojack on the theft rate of
Lojack equipped vehicles, it is also of interest to see how the eect changed as the cars got older.
All cars in the Ford Lojack program had one year of recovery service; afterwards the renewal of the
service was voluntary. Lojack executives calculate that roughly 60% of Lojack equipped vehicles
re-enrolled at the end of the rst year, but the proportion was 40% at the end of the second year.
21The data allow me to estimate the impact of Lojack as the proportion of cars that eectively had
it was declining. Within this group of cars, it would be impossible for thieves to distinguish which
had continued the service and which had not. Such high uncertainty about which cars had Lojack
resembles the way that Lojack was sold in the United States, albeit at much higher Lojack coverage
rates in Mexico. Ayres and Levitt (1998) were only able to observe Lojack coverage rates in the
range of 0-2%, and found large but rapidly decreasing marginal eects.
I subdivide the Lojack dummy into three categories: a dummy for Lojack equipped and age
up to one year, Lojack equipped and age between one and two years, and Lojack equipped and
age between two and three years. The data are on Lojack models in Lojack states and in distant
states. The last three columns in Table 6 report the results of my estimation. At every age the
coecients are very similar to the average eect shown in the rst three columns of the table. This
suggests that the deterrence eect of Lojack was very similar in magnitude regardless of how old
the vehicles were. One interesting aspect of this result is that as the cars grew older, their likelihood
of having the Lojack recovery service fell from 100% to 40%. Given that I am controlling for age,
this suggests that the reduction in thefts obtained as a deterrence eect by installing Lojack in all
of the vehicles of a certain model could have been obtained by a random - - from the point of view
of thieves - - installation of a proportion much smaller than one. Ayres and Levitt (1998) estimated
an eect of Lojack of around -50% in thefts if the proportion of cars equipped with Lojack was
around 1.5%. They also noted that the marginal eect would have to decrease rapidly after the
level of coverage. If the eects estimated here lie on the same function as the one in their paper,
then it could be reasonable to conclude that the additional deterrence eect from having Lojack
penetration rates above 1.5%-2.0% is extremely small.
The regression results point to an almost total displacement of thefts averted from Lojack-
equipped models into vehicles in neighboring states. Indeed, using the Count columns in the
tables, it is possible to add the number of statistically signicant reductions and increases in auto
theft generated by the introduction of Lojack. This sum is around zero, suggesting that all of the
thefts averted in the Lojack-equipped group were displaced towards non-Lojack-equipped vehicles
in nearby states. As a corollary, from a social point of view, the program generated a net social
loss for society, given that the costs of implementing Lojack served only to displace thefts across
car owners. Notwithstanding, this conclusion may not be entirely correct from a longer term
22perspective, as is argued next.
The Ford Lojack program in Mexico was halted in 2006. Under severe cost cutting pressures, the
automaker decided to drop the program. In spite of this, over these years the company providing
the Lojack recovery service had acquired experience and installed capacity to continue providing
the service at a reasonable cost. After the Ford deal collapsed, the company started oering Lojack
to anyone interested in having the recovery service, ending the strategy of marketing to an exclusive
set of cars. The company launched an aggressive publicity campaign and expanded their service
to many other states and now oer coverage in all states. This way of selling Lojack - - similar
to the way it was sold in the United States - - should result in generalized declines in theft rates,
with large positive externalities and a positive net social benet from the technology, as Ayres and
Levitt (1998) have argued.
From this long term perspective, the temporary exclusivity agreement - - over the period an-
alyzed here - - with no net positive social benets, may have been a necessary initial phase that
allowed for a generalized decrease in thefts in the future. Nevertheless, the results presented in
this paper imply that selling Lojack to a discernible set of cars severely limits its potential positive
spillovers. This nding may be useful in crafting future scenarios in which policymakers are better
informed about how to regulate and adopt new technology so as to maximize society's welfare.
6.1 Robustness Checks
6.1.1 Data Limitations
This section reviews the implications for the analysis of using insured vehicle theft data together
with total stock of cars, instead of only the insured vehicle stock of cars. The intuition of the
problem this presents is relatively simple: the interpretation of the results is invalid if Lojack
generated changes in the likelihood of a Lojack-equipped vehicle being insured. If buying a car
with Lojack made owners less likely to buy insurance, then this would reduce the number of cars
exposed to theft that are captured in the data, potentially inuencing some of the results.
The problem can be seen in terms of the estimated model. The data available, in which total
stock of cars instead of the insured vehicle stock is used as the exposure variable, can be understood
as a situation in which the true exposure variable is overblown by a factor larger than one. Assume
23that ij is the probability that a vehicle model i in state j is insured. Then the true stock of cars
is STrue
ijy = ij  SObs
ijy , where SObs refers to the stock of vehicles observable to the econometrician,
while STrue refers to the actual stock of insured cars on the road. Then, if the true model is
E[Theftsijytjxijyt] = (Strue
ijy )  exp
 
ij + j  t + Lojack  Lojackijyt +
6 X
a=0
a  I[Age = a]
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Substituting STrue
ijy = ij  SObs




ln(ij) + ij + j  t + Lojack  Lojackijyt +
6 X
a=0
a  I[Age = a]
!
ln(ij) + ij is then absorbed by the model and state-specic xed eect and the error in the
exposure variable does not bias the results. In conclusion, the specication used is robust to error in
the exposure variable. However, if ij falls when Lojack is introduced, then the coecient of interest
(Lojack) is not identied. For this reason, I now present evidence that: 1) Lojack-equipped vehicles
were just as likely to be insured as non-Lojack-equipped vehicles; and 2) insurance likelihood of
Lojack models evolved in an identical manner to non Lojack models once Lojack was introduced.
This allows me to conclude that Lojack introduction was uncorrelated with insurance coverage (ij)
probability, as required by the econometric model.
First, note that the scope for this behavioral response would be muted by the fact that in
the years after Lojack was introduced, around 70% of new vehicles were bought with nancing
loans, which require insurance coverage during the life of the loan. Cars bought through a loan are
required to be insured because the nancing company otherwise can lose the collateral that can be
repossessed in case of an accident or theft. The insurance requirement for cars bought on credit
was not relaxed because the car had Lojack.
The data I use to measure the possible impact of Lojack introduction on insurance probability
is the AMIS time series of the number of cars insured by year in the whole country for every car
model. Since Lojack states command 40% of nationwide sales, a reduction in the insurance coverage
of Lojack models would show up in the national insurance coverage rate for those models.
I use national sales for the years 1999-2005 and the number of national insurance contracts, to
construct a database that partitions the data into combinations of triplets (model group, year sold,
24year insured). I then generate the variable proportion insured which is dened as the number of
vehicles insured divided by the stock of cars sold for every (model group, year sold, year insured)
cell. I rst use data for the years after the introduction of Lojack to regress the proportion insured
on a dummy indicating whether the vehicle was sold with Lojack (Lojackij), calendar year dummies
(I[t = 1999];:::;I[t = 2005]) to capture time trends in national insurance coverage, and a set of age-
of-car dummies (I[Age = 1];:::;I[Age = 6]) that exibly capture average changes in the insurance
probability as the car ages. The estimated equation in the rst column of Table 8 is
Proportion Insurediyt = 0+LojackLojackiyt+age=t yI[Age = t y]+year=tI[Y ear = t]+uiyt
where i refers to the model group, y to the year the cars were sold, and t refers to the year of the
observation. The coecient of interest is Lojack. In the table, the Lojack coecient is insignicant;
this suggests that after Lojack was implemented, Lojack models were just as likely to be insured
as non-Lojack models. Thus buying a car equipped with Lojack did not reduce the probability of
the car being insured as long as Lojack models were as likely to be insured as their counterparts
before Lojack was introduced. The second regression addresses this issue by looking for dierential
changes over time in insurance coverage for Lojack models.
The equation estimated in the second column of the table is
Proportion Insurediyt = i+LojackLojackiyt+age=t yI[Age = t y]+year=tI[Y ear = t]+uiyt
which diers from the previous regression in that it includes a model-specic intercept and uses
data from all observations available: for the years 1999-2005. The insignicance of the coecient in
the table again suggests that Lojack models neither observed a decrease nor an increase in insurance
likelihood, compared to other car models, once Lojack was introduced.
The regressions lead me to conclude that Lojack did not induce a reduction in the probability
of insuring vehicles for customers who bought Lojack-equipped cars. There may have been various
reasons for this. People who bought the car with credit had no option of opting out of insuring
their vehicle even if they wanted to. Another reason is that people value the services of insurance
companies aside from theft coverage: insuring vehicle damage in case of accidents, medical expense
25insurance for vehicle occupants, and civil responsibility.
Aside from the concern about Lojack altering the likelihood of insuring a car, a second data
caveat that should be raised here is the extent to which the results are exclusive to the set of insured
vehicles in Mexico. At best, if theft risk is not correlated with the insurance status of the car - -
conditional on all observable characteristics like model group, age, and state - - then the results
should generalize to all vehicles, as if the data resulted from a traditional random sampling scheme,
where the sample was insured vehicles. Conditional on vehicle characteristics, there are arguments
for why insurance status does not aect theft risk. The rst is that, conditional on characteristics,
thieves cannot distinguish vehicles that are insured from those that are not. The second is that the
insurance status of the car does not aect the payo to the thief.
In the worst case scenario, theft risk has dierent dynamics according to the insurance status of
the vehicle, even after conditioning on available characteristics. For example, insurance status may
be correlated with the geographic location (or risk environment) of where the vehicle is driven. It
may be the case, for example, that in rural areas, where theft is almost nonexistent, car owners are
much less likely to insure their vehicles. If this is the case, { and I have no way of knowing which
of these two scenarios is closer to reality { the results presented here only will pertain to insured
vehicles. But even if this is the case, the results are important, because the majority of vehicles in
Mexico are insured.
6.1.2 Specication Robustness Checks
I now report the results from variants of the main regressions in order to verify their robustness.
Tables 9, 10, and 11 report results from the main specication in the rst line, together with the
results of the dierent robustness checks described below.
The rst robustness check, presented in the row labeled Negative Binomial in Tables 9, 10,
and 11, replicates the main regressions using a Negative Binomial estimation procedure. Cameron
and Trivedi (1998) warn that tting a Poisson when there is overdispersion in the data generates
standard errors that are too small. As an approximation, with an overdispersion parameter of
, the standard errors should be 2 larger than estimated by a Poisson regression. A Negative
Binomial regression does not suer from this fact, but is sensitive to misspecication of the data
generating process, unlike the Poisson regression.
26Comparing the standard errors of both estimated models shows that those of the Negative
Binomial are very similar, and in some cases even smaller than those in the Poisson regression. The
extremely small 's found in the Poisson specication suggested that the standard errors in the
Poisson and the Negative Binomial regression would not be very dierent. The size of the standard
errors in the Negative Binomial estimation conrm this intuition. The estimated coecients in the
Binomial model are extremely close and of the same sign as those in the Poisson model. Given the
robustness of the Poisson model to misspecication, and the small degree of overdispersion in the
data, I take it as the preferred model.
The second specication robustness check is suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (1998). It
consists of ignoring the Poisson model and working under the assumption that the conditional
mean is correctly specied as E[Theftsjx] = ex0. The rows labeled Non-Linear Least Squares
report the estimations of Thefts on ex0, where all the covariates are the same as those of the
baseline specication. The qualitative results are the same as in the baseline Poisson model, except
that the geographical externalities and impact coecients are larger than those of the Poisson
regression.
The third specication test uses another approach to the problem of having only insured vehicle
theft data. I inate theft cases by the corresponding reciprocal of the national insurance rate for
each (model group, year made, year stolen), so that if only half of the vehicles are insured, the
observed theft cases are multiplied by two. This new dependent variable would adequately correct
for the lack of information on insured vehicle stocks at the state level if national insurance rates were
the same as state rates, and if theft risk were uncorrelated with insurance status. This is a crude
correction, but in exchange it directly scales the dependent variable proportional to any national
changes in insurance likelihood. With inated thefts, the table shows that negative geographical
externalities persist only for Lojack cars. The impact on Lojack vehicles in Lojack states (Table
11) shows a larger drop in theft with this measure than with the uncorrected theft measure. In
contrast to the main specication, however, the regression that uses inated thefts displays negative
externalities to non-Lojack vehicles in Lojack states. Also in contrast to the main specication, the
use of inated thefts suggests that old Lojack car models in Lojack states benetted from lower
theft rates after the introduction of Lojack.
The fourth specication test is shown in Tables 10 and 11. It consists of eliminating the control
27observations used in the main specication. In particular, observations from distant Lojack states
are not used. As was explained in the Estimation Strategy section, and is shown in the tables, the
results are virtually unchanged from the main specication results.
The last robustness check deals with an alternative explanation for the results. The theft-
risk function used in the analysis assumes that there is a linear relationship between the stock of
vehicles and the number of thefts, by constraining the coecient on the stock of vehicles to enter
lineally in the regression. However, this might not be a good model of how theft actually works.
For example, it may be that the demand for stolen vehicles is simply a target number of stolen
cars, independent of the stock available (See Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and Thaler (1997)).
If this were the case, and Lojack generated an increase in sales of Lojack-equipped models, then
my assumed specication would show a fall in theft risk, even though Lojack only generated an
increase in sales. Any feature in a car that increased sales { like lower prices or more add-ons {
would have the same eect as Lojack. This would make my interpretation about the eects of
Lojack completely misleading.
The main specication can be altered to accommodate this alternative hypothesis. This is
done by eliminating the restriction that the stock variable have a coecient equal to one. If the
targeting hypothesis is true, then the stock coecient would be smaller than one and the coecient
on Lojack would be sharply reduced (in absolute value). The rows labeled Unconstrained Exposure
in Tables 9, 10, and 11 report the coecients from this alternative specication, together with the
coecient on the exposure variable. The results are virtually unchanged from the main specication.
Furthermore, the coecient on the exposure variable does not seem to be consistently below or
above one. In conclusion, the targeting hypothesis does not seem be supported in the data.
To expand that hypothesis, the stock of cars can be assumed to have a dierential impact on
theft according to the type of car. For example, sports cars or luxury cars might behave more
like the targeting hypothesis above, while compact cars might track sales closely. I modied the
regression above to allow for a dierential impact of the stock of cars according to the vehicle
categories of Table 1. I achieved this by allowing the stock coecient to be dierent for each of
the seven vehicle categories. The results, available in the web appendix to this paper, again are
unchanged. These two tests suggest that an increase in sales is accompanied by a proportional
increase in thefts, regardless of the kind of vehicle that is being considered.
28Another exercise (only reported in the web appendix for space reasons) is to run the baseline
regression sequentially deleting all of the observations for one of the car models. This would conrm
that it is not one model that is driving the results. The coecients are extremely similar to those
of the baseline results.
7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the impact on auto theft of the introduction of the Lojack vehicle recovery
system to a discernible group of beneciary cars. The theoretical auto theft model predicted that
this would result in Lojack deterrence benets being conned to Lojack equipped cars. It also
predicted a displacement of thefts to non-Lojack equipped vehicles.
The econometric analysis of the theft data pointed to a reduction in thefts of Lojack-equipped
vehicles on the order of 55%. The reduction in thefts is a product of thieves attempting fewer
appropriations of Lojack-equipped vehicles, that is a deterrence eect. Nevertheless, this eect
was accompanied by an increase in thefts of vehicles in states surrounding those where Lojack was
implemented. That increase in thefts was around 120% for Lojack models and 25% for non-Lojack
models. Thefts were not found to be aected in states far from those where Lojack was introduced.
Displacement of thefts to non-Lojack-equipped vehicles in Lojack coverage states did not appear
to be statistically signicant. This may be because the pool of non-Lojack-equipped vehicles was so
large in Lojack states relative to Lojack-equipped ones that the eect was too small to be detected
in the data.
Lojack models built before the introduction of Lojack experienced no signicantly dierent theft
risk than would have been expected without the introduction of Lojack. The signs of the coecient
suggested a slight reduction in thefts, but not at statistically signicant levels.
Finally, the analysis showed that the eect of Lojack as Lojack-equipped cars aged - - and as
the proportion of vehicles with Lojack coverage went from 100% to 40% - - were very similar in
magnitude. As the proportion covered by Lojack fell, the coecients of impact did not decrease.
Given that the estimation included controls for age, and together with results from Ayres and Levitt
(1998), this points to a very small additional deterrence eect of Lojack when the proportion of
cars with the device goes beyond 1.5% or 2%.
29Adding up the estimated impacts of Lojack on all car groups suggests that the deterrence
eect, generating lower thefts for Lojack-equipped vehicles, was almost completely mirrored by
increased thefts of non-Lojack-equipped cars. Given the large real cost of providing the recovery
service, the fact that it only generated displacement eects means that the Ford Lojack program
in Mexico resulted in a net loss for society. Nevertheless, the intervention as implemented in the
analysis period may have served as a platform upon which Lojack recovery services were later made
available to all vehicle owners (after 2006). This change in the way that Lojack was oered to the
public provides an avenue for future work, in which theft reductions generated by Lojack in the
entire car eet are quantied. Another avenue for future work is determining whether insurance
companies reduced insurance prices for Lojack-equipped vehicles. This would measure the degree
of responsiveness in the insurance industry to changes in theft rates. A decrease in the price of
insuring such vehicles would be evidence of competitiveness in the sector.
Comparing both strategies for selling Lojack revealed that oering Lojack to all car owners
presents the problem of underprovision because of the substantial positive externalities that the
device generates. On the other hand, selling Lojack only to a distinguishable set of cars simply
generates a redistribution of theft risk across car owners. One possible solution may be for gov-
ernments to randomly provide the device to a proportion of vehicle owners, in such a way that the
marginal social benets are equated with the marginal social costs. This policy would be socially
preferred to mandating the installation of a recovery device on all vehicles, as was being attempted
by Mexico City ocials in 2008.
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318 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Histogram of Thefts
The unit of observation is the number of thefts in each model group, state, year made, and year stolen combination.
Note: Graph truncated at 10 thefts for visibility purposes. The full distribution follows the same pattern.
32Figure 2: Geographical Externalities Identication Strategy
Figure 3: Geographical Externalities Identication Strategy: Distance Categories
33Table 1: States, Dates and Models where Lojack was Introduced
Model Group Category Lojack Introduction Dates by State
Treatment Group Jalisco Estado de Mexico DF Morelos
Windstar Minivan Sep 2000 Mar 2002 Mar 2002 Mar 2002
Explorer SUV Jun 2002 Jun 2002 Jun 2002 Jun 2002
Escape SUV Sep 2002 Sep 2002 Sep 2002 Sep 2002
Mondeo Sedan Dec 2002 Dec 2002 Dec 2002 Dec 2002
Expedition SUV Sep 2002 Sep 2002 Sep 2002 Sep 2002
Focus Compact Mar 2003 Mar 2003 Mar 2003 Mar 2003
Excursion SUV Sep 2002 Sep 2002 Sep 2002 Sep 2002
Grand Marquis Luxury sedan Sep 2002 Sep 2002 Sep 2002 Sep 2002
Sable Sedan Sep 2002 Sep 2002 Sep 2002 Sep 2002
Mustang Sports car Sep 2004 Sep 2004 Sep 2004 Sep 2004
Lobo Truck Sep 2004 Sep 2004 Sep 2004 Sep 2004
Town Car Luxury Sedan Jun 2005 Jun 2005 Jun 2005 Jun 2005
Navigator SUV Jun 2005 Jun 2005 Jun 2005 Jun 2005
Control Group








Compact (CH:Neon) (HO:Civic) (NI:Sentra,Almera,Tsubame,Lucino) (PE:
306,307) (PE:206) (RE:Clio) (SE:Ibiza,Cordoba) (SE:Toledo)
(VW:Jetta,Beetle,Golf,Cabrio,PointerWagon)
Minivan (CH:Voyager,Ram Wagon) (VW:Sharan) (NI:Quest) (SE:Alhambra)
(VW:Combi,Eurovan) (VW:Sharan) (GM:Venture,CadillacEscalade,Express)
(HO:Odyssey)
Sedan (CH:Stratus,Cirrus,Cruiser) (HO:Accord) (NI:Altima) (VW:Passat)
(RE:Megane,Scenic) (GM:Malibu,Grandam,Grandprix,Vectra,Tigra)
(GM:Cavalier,Sunre, Astra,Chevy SW,Meriva,Zara)
Subcompact (CH:Atos) (FO:Fiesta,Ikon,Ka) (VW:OldBeetle) (VW:Derby,Pointer,Polo)
(GM:Chevy,Monza,Corsa,Matiz)
Sports car (GM:Corvette) (SE:Leon)



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38Table 6: Impact on Lojack Models and Eect as Lojack Cars Aged
Poisson Regression
Dep. Var: Number of Thefts
Impact on Lojack Models Impact as Car Ages
Coe IRR Count Coe IRR Count
Lojack Equipped  0.7987*** 0.4498***  151.87***
(0.1346) (0.0605) (16.73)
Lojack equipped & Age=1  0.7597*** 0.4677***  146.94***
(0.1713) (0.080) (22.13)
Lojack equipped & Age=2  0.6988*** 0.4971***  138.82***
(0.1688) (0.0839) (23.18)
Lojack equipped & Age=3  0.9896*** 0.3717***  173.46***
(0.2868) (0.1066) (29.43)
(State, Car Model) Dummies YES YES
Sales Exposure Control YES YES
State Specic Time Trend YES YES
Age of Car Dummies YES YES
Observations 3,173 3,173
(State, Car Model) Groups 119 119
 0.100 0.102
Observations weighted by sales. Robust bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. The Poisson regression
coecient estimate is reported under the Coe column, while the incidence rate ratio column (IRR) reports the estimated coecient
in its exponentiated form. An IRR is interpreted as the ratio of expected number of thefts with Lojack implemented to the number of
thefts if Lojack had not been implemented. The Count column is a transformation of the coecient in the IRR column that, together
with data on total thefts before Lojack, estimates the impact of the intervention in terms of annual thefts generated (if positive) or
prevented (if negative).  is the estimated conditional over(+)/underdispersion( ) in the dependent variable. Both regressions use
data from Lojack models in Lojack states and in distant Non Lojack states. LojackEquipped is a dummy variable equal to one for car
models that were sold with Lojack. LojackEquipped&Age = k is a dummy variable equal to one if the car was sold with Lojack and
is aged between (k   1)  12 and k  12 months old.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1% for the test H0 :  = 0 in the Coe and Count columns, and H0 : e() = 1



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 8: Eect of Lojack on Insurance Coverage
Dep. Var: Proportion of Cars Insured Nationally
(1) (2)
Lojack Equipped 0.0232 0.0362
(0.2502) (0.2251)
Year Dummies YES YES
Age of Car Dummies YES YES
Model Group Dummies NO YES
Data used t  2003 t 2 [1999;2005]
Observations 354 1510
R2 0.04 0.07
Dependent variable is the proportion of cars in a (model
group, year made) combination that are insured nationally
in a given year, divided by the number of cars sold nationally
for the same (model group, year made) duplet. The regres-
sion in the rst column uses data for 2003 on, when Lojack
had been implemented for most Lojack vehicles. The regres-
sion in the second column has model specic xed eects and
uses all observations. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































43Table 11: Robustness Checks: Impact on Lojack Models and Eects as Lojack Cars Aged
Dep. Var: Number of Thefts
Impact on Lojack Models Impact as Car Ages
Coe IRR Coe IRR
Main Specication Lojack Equipped  0.7987*** 0.4498***
(0.1346) (0.0605)
Lojack equipped & Age = 1  0.7597*** 0.4677***
(0.1713) (0.080)
Lojack equipped & Age = 2  0.6988*** 0.4971***
(0.1688) (0.0839)
Lojack equipped & Age = 3  0.9896*** 0.3717***
(0.2868) (0.1066)
Negative Binomial Lojack Equipped  0.7709*** 0.4625***
(0.1386) (0.0641)
Lojack equipped & Age = 1  0.7692*** 0.4633***
(0.1457) (0.0675)
Lojack equipped & Age = 2  0.7426*** 0.4758***
(0.2164) (0.1029)
Lojack equipped & Age = 3  0.7325*** 0.4806***
(0.2109) (0.1013)
Nonlinear Least Squares Lojack Equipped  1.2665*** 0.2818***
(0.2373) (0.0668)
Lojack equipped & Age = 1  1.2232*** 0.2942***
(0.2097) (0.0617)
Lojack equipped & Age = 2  1.2036*** 0.3000***
(0.3280) (0.0984)
Lojack equipped & Age = 3  1.4593*** 0.2323***
(0.4308) (0.1001)
Inated Thefts Lojack Equipped  1.5173*** 0.2193***
(0.0762) (0.0167)
Lojack equipped & Age = 1  1.487745*** 0.2258***
0.2301793 (0.0520)
Lojack equipped & Age = 2  1.400944*** 0.2463***
0.2669831 (0.0657)
Lojack equipped & Age = 3  1.642465*** 0.1935***
0.3875504 (0.0749)
No Control Observations Lojack Equipped  0.8071*** 0.4461***
(0.1556) (0.0694)
Lojack equipped & Age = 1  0.7675*** 0.4641***
(0.1751) (0.0812)
Lojack equipped & Age = 2  0.7072*** 0.4929***
(0.1737) (0.0856)
Lojack equipped & Age = 3  0.9955*** 0.3695***
(0.2635) (0.0973)
Unconstrained Exposure Lojack Equipped  0.5478*** 0.5781***
(0.1262) (0.0729)
Lojack equipped & Age = 1  0.5184** 0.5954***
(0.2223) (0.1324)
Lojack equipped & Age = 2  0.4371*** 0.6458***
(0.1538) (0.0993)




Observations weighted by sales. Robust bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. All specications
include (State,Car Model) dummies, Stock Exposure Control, state specic time trend, and Age of Car Dummies. The Poisson
regression coecient estimate is reported under the Coe column, while the incidence rate ratio column (IRR) reports the
estimated coecient in its exponentiated form. An IRR is interpreted as the ratio of expected number of thefts with Lojack
implemented to the number of thefts if Lojack had not been implemented. Both regressions use data from Lojack models in
Lojack states and in distant Non Lojack states. LojackEquipped is dummy variable equal to one for car models that were sold
with Lojack. LojackEquipped&Age = k is a dummy variable equal to one if the car was sold with Lojack and is aged between
(k   1)  12 and k  12 months old. Exposure refers to the Stock of Vehicles control.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1% for the test H0 :  = 0 in the Coe columns, and H0 : e() = 1
in the IRR column.
44